












This paper addresses one particularly Parisian strand of dance history which feeds into the current debate over the relationship between practice and theory. The argument advanced here is that our contemporary conceptions of practice and theory are strongly shaped by the changing relationship between notions of rationality and irrationality in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The example of the cancan will be used to show how these philosophical ideas were applied to dance, and to point towards the ways in which dance history can enlighten twenty-first century issues.
The distinction between rationality and irrationality was first formulated by Greek philosophers, but it re-emerged with the questioning of religion in the West in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and reason became the foundation of Enlightenment philosophy. Enlightenment thought placed reason as the pinnacle of an historical progression from the primitive to the civilised, a model that would develop in the late nineteenth century into social evolutionism. The white, upper class, male subject enjoyed a position at the top of this scale, whereas women, the working classes, and other races were placed somewhat lower down.
Norbert Elias (1994), writing in the 1930s, showed how this scale was largely constructed through the body. He argued that since the Renaissance, the European body has undergone a process of civilisation in which it has learnt to exercise self-restraint over its spontaneous physical urges and impulses, closing itself off from other bodies and from interactions with the outside world. He called this body homo clausus, or closed man, implying a body with a firm outline, that doesn’t let anything in or out. According to Elias, this conception of the body was constructed largely through prescriptions of manners and etiquette, which placed taboos on activities that broke bodily boundaries, such as sweating, for example. He argues that this development helped to generate the self-detachment necessary for scientific thinking, and the closed off body therefore became associated with scientific rationality. This model of a scale from the irrational to the rational with homo clausus at the top was a powerful one, because it facilitated the idea that rationality, or theoretical thinking, could be separated off from the materiality of the body, and exist in a pure realm unaffected by the passions and emotions. Elias does not discuss the implications of this civilising process for the distribution of power between bodies of different genders, classes or races, but this theme is taken up by Dorinda Outram (1989).
Outram argues that homo clausus only reached its fully developed form in the wake of the French Revolution, when the new French nation was constructed on the model of the rational, closed, specifically male, middle-class body, drawing on the Roman Stoic tradition of detachment from bodily passions and emotions. Female, working class and racially other bodies were excluded from this national body politic, and therefore from the French electorate, on the basis that their bodies were open to external influences and internal urges, and were therefore irrational. This separation between rational male bodies and irrational female ones is evident in Jacques-Louis David’s famous Revolutionary painting The Oath of the Horatii (1784), in which the strong, resolute bodies of three brothers pledge their allegiance to Rome before battle, while their mothers and sisters cry. Outram contends that the subtext to the French Revolution was a struggle between rational and irrational conceptions of body, a battle that rationality won. The bourgeoisie rose to cultural and political power after the Revolution, bringing with them the rational physical ideal, although without the heroic, active aspects of Revolutionary Stoicism captured by David. The rational body became what Outram calls a ‘non-body’ (Outram, 1989: 156), merely a vehicle for the rational mind it contains, projecting all of its openness and materiality onto irrational others.
What I think Outram ignores, however, is the extent to which the excluded irrational body retained a potency, through the Revolution and for the rest of the nineteenth century, to liberate the individual from the constraints of rational behaviour. This potential became culturally significant in the late 1820s, as Charles X increasingly restricted personal freedoms, and it became clear that the liberatory ideals of 1789 were being sidelined (see Hauser, 1951). The disenfranchised masses rallied for another revolution, and it was in this second revolutionary moment that the irrational body re-emerged as an emblem of freedom.
French romanticism of the late 1820s and 1830s produced images of the grotesque, irrational but liberatory body, such as Delacroix’s painting Liberty Leading the People (1830), which depicts a bare-breasted female figure leading working class and petit bourgeois men over the barricades in the Revolution of 1830. These images also influenced French ballet in the 1820s, as female ballerinas took centre stage and performed with an otherworldly freedom of movement. However, at this same moment, a dance form was emerging which would take the performance of irrationality far beyond the limits of romanticism. The cancan was inspired by rumours of the freer dancing body being performed in romantic ballet at the Paris Opera. In working class dance halls in Paris, this idea of a body liberated from the confines of rationality was applied to the quadrille, creating a parody of what had previously been a bourgeois dance.
The pre-cancan quadrille had used the civilised conception of movement that derived from the court ballet of Louis XIV. This involved verticality, a sense of lightness and resistance to gravity, centralised control of the external limbs, outward presentation, limited body contact between men and women, and classical alignment and proportion - the very features of the rational body. This can be contrasted with the early cancan, which involved a greater sense of gravity, breaks and angles in the body rather than verticality, greater energy, exaggerated and isolated movements of the outer limbs, such as kicks, greater body contact between men and women, and improvisation. By freeing the limbs from central control, and liberating the dancer from set figures, the cancan performed a body that appeared to escape the rational regulation of the mind, and was therefore irrational. In this early form, it was sometimes called the chahut, meaning uproar. Like the quadrille, it was initially danced by both men and women, as a social dance, not a performance. But in the 1840s this began to change.
The dance had become popular in public carnival balls in Paris, where all the classes mixed. Although certain male cancan stars emerged in this context, such as Chicard and Brididi, female dancers began to dominate its performance. At the same time, bourgeois men began to withdraw from performing the dance, and restricted themselves to spectating. What emerged was a dynamic that the film theorist Mary Ann Doane describes in relation to early cinema spectatorship: “a denial of the [white, bourgeois, male] body through the projection of contingency and embodiment onto the white woman or racial other” (Doane, 1993: 15). In other words, bourgeois men asserted their rationality by denying their bodiliness, and therefore withdrawing from the dance into intellectual spectatorship. At the same time, lower class women, many of whom were courtesans or prostitutes, took on the embodiment of irrationality in order to offer bourgeois men a moment of release from rational norms, at a price.
The cancan was not the first dance form to construct the relationship between performer and spectator in this way. In romantic ballet the rejection of the male dancer was accompanied by the cultivation of a specifically male spectatorial role by critics such as Theophile Gautier. But although romantic ballet began to figure the ballerina’s body as irrational, for example in the hysteria of Giselle discussed by Felicia McCarren (1998), it still retained elements of the aristocratic performance of an artful body that Sarah Cohen (2000) describes. The cancan, however, broke entirely with this tradition, making irrationality the central theme of its performance, and rationality, or the struggle to maintain it, the central theme of its spectatorship.
In the cancan of the mid- to late nineteenth century, the distinction between spectator and performer was directly mapped onto the distinction between rationality and irrationality. The irrationality of the cancan dancer was expressed through her grotesque body, to use Bakhtin’s (1984) term, a body which emphasises the orifices which allow substances to move into and out of the body, and the reproductive organs, which define the body as unfinished, involved in a perpetual cycle of birth and death. By contrast, contemporary illustrations of the Moulin Rouge show the spectators to be predominantly male, clothed in bourgeois attire, upright, and respectable. However, the primary distinction here is not in fact between male and female. Although the performer/spectator relationship in the cancan was modelled on the gender division of the heterosexual relationship, there were also many women in the audience at the Moulin Rouge whose bourgeois respectability qualified them for the role of rational spectator. Furthermore, the version of the cancan performed at the Moulin Rouge, called the quadrille naturaliste, incorporated male as well as female dancers, such as Valentin le Désossé (Valentin the boneless). While gender-crossing was common at the boundary between performer and spectator, the distinction between rationality and irrationality was less negotiable.
An ideal distinction operated in the cancan between performer and spectator which corresponded with that between the rational and irrational, low and high, body and mind. Performer and spectator were therefore split along the lines of Cartesian dualism, and in fact the Enlightenment distinction between rationality and irrationality had philosophical roots in Descartes’ mind-body split. In the late nineteenth century, this distinction was given scientific weight by a renewed interest in evolutionary theories, particularly those of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, as well as Charles Darwin. The relationship between the irrational performer and the rational spectator was now conceived as an encounter between less and more evolved humans. For example, the journalist André Chadourne located himself on the rational, evolved side of this equation in 1889 by declaring his wish to, “stop those horrifying exhibitions of women found in the worst gutters… these Goulues, these Grilles-d’égout who dance on the French stage the kind of dance steps that are unknown even to the lowest form of savages” (Chadourne cited in Gordon, 2003: 631-632). However, Chadourne had clearly witnessed these horrifying exhibitions. Spectatorship could be aligned with scientific observation, and facilitated the application of theories, such as social evolutionism, and the making of theoretical and moral judgements. Any other kind of bodily interaction with the cancan dancer, however, would compromise rationality. This evolutionary distinction between performer and spectator was reproduced in many nineteenth-century dance forms, including blackface minstrelsy in America, which was contemporaneous with the cancan, and several late nineteenth-century dance forms including American burlesque, and European appropriations of Middle Eastern dances.
However, as Jane Goodall (2002) has argued, nineteenth-century performance often had an ambivalent relationship to science, reflecting it while at the same time distorting the ordered world it presented. Like several other nineteenth-century performance genres, such as epileptic singing described by Rae Beth Gordon (2001), the cancan undermined its embodiment of evolutionary difference by threatening to infect the rational with the irrational, seducing the bourgeois spectator to degenerate down the evolutionary scale. For example, the journalist Edgar Baes, warned of the risks of attending the Moulin Rouge: “More than one [spectator] sticks his tongue out and twists his arms craving more, hypnotized by the hectic transports of a monstrous and degrading lack of decency” (Baes cited in Gordon, 2001: 97). Cancan spectatorship was fraught with the risk of becoming infected with irrational embodiment. In fact the cancan was often described in the same terms as hysteria, the supposedly contagious pathological affliction of late nineteenth-century lower class women. The infectious irrationality of the cancan was part of its attraction, offering a release from the rational conventions of bourgeois life, but it also threatened the social status of the spectator, which was based on maintaining rationality. The cancan dangerously exposed the fact that rationality could only be maintained by a constant act of denial of the materiality of the body.
Perhaps for this reason, when Loïe Fuller offered an alternative to the irrational model of the female dancing body in the 1890s, the cancan quickly fell out of fashion. Fuller rationalised her body by transforming freedom of movement from an act of seduction into high art. By doing so, she liberated the spectator from the threat of irrationality. The bourgeoisie, keen to prove their rational disembodiment, quickly rejected the cancan, and switched their allegiance to new, more modern dance forms. The art critic and collector Roger Marx wrote of Fuller in La Revue Encyclopédique:

Her success is due to the contrast between her kind of dancing and that to which we have recently been subjected. Too many danseuses have been giving poor imitations of “the Andalusian’s impish stomping” or have emphasised a swaying of the hips and a rotation of the pelvis, or have resorted to other bodily contortions. These women wear as little as they can get by with, and what they wear accentuates the buttocks and the breasts. Loïe Fuller is utterly different. She keeps her body straight, and she derives effects from the very profusion of her garments.
Marx cited in Current and Current, 1997, 55

Fuller was described as chaste and innocent (see Garelick, 1995) in comparison with the cancan and the other late nineteenth-century dance forms which presented the female body as an irrational attraction.
In the twentieth century, the emergence of a rationalised female body shifted the distinction between rationality and irrationality away from the performer/spectator relationship onto different types of dance practice. Modern dance entered the realm of high culture, while the cancan and other dance forms which hypnotised the spectator, were relegated to the low culture of working class venues, tourist attractions or dance interludes in film musicals. Dance critics often focused their theorising on dance as high art, regarding low dance practices as entertainment that resisted rational analysis.
However, in the late twentieth century, postmodern perspectives have allowed a critique not only of the modernist rejection of the low, but of the underlying Enlightenment distinction between rational and irrational. Dance studies has emerged out of the postmodern impulse to subject areas previously dismissed as irrational to theoretical investigation. However, the incorporation of dance into the historically rationalist realm of scholarship also raises certain issues. In terms of the place of dance studies in the wider academic arena, the wish to raise the status of the discipline by dispelling the notion that the body is irrational, must be balanced against the need to recognise the unique capacity of the body and the choreographic process to operate in ways that escape, confound, and sometimes subvert the hegemonic rationalist order. And within the discipline, the moves towards integrating practice and theory in university teaching and in practice-based research, must be accompanied by a willingness to question which dance forms are regarded as amenable to theoretical analysis, and which forms are excluded from the notion of ‘practice’ by their previous designation as irrational or low. The cancan, as a product of the Enlightenment scale of rationality, can help us to historicise these struggles, and to understand the sources of the powerful forces which have shaped them and are still at play today.
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